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DISTRIEUTINC THE GAINS FROM TRADE WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
ABSTRACT
Weargue that the incomplete information which the government has about
domestic agents means that tariffs become an optimal instrument to protect
them from import competition.We solve for the optimal government policies.
subject to the political constraint of ensuring Pareto gains from trade, the
incentive compatibility constraint, and the government's budget constraint.We
find that the optimal policies take the form of nonlinear tariffs, so that both
buyers and sellers of the import face an effective price which exceeds its
world level.We find that the tariffs are never complete, in the sense of
bringing prices (or all individuals back to their initial level.Rather,itwill
always be possible to make some individuals strictly better off than at the






When faced with lower prices because of import competition, industries
often lobby for, and receive, protection.In the last decade, a formal analysis
of lobbying pressure and the resulting protection has been the topic of much
research in the political economy and trade literature.Early analyses often
assumed that the method of protection was simply tariffs.' while later papers
have explicitly compared tariffs, quotas, or other policy instruments.2In the
context of a median voter model, Mayer and Riezman (1987) have argued that
tariffs are inferior to a production tax/subsidy in that sense that all voters
-would prefer the latter.Thus, the question arises as to why tariffs or other
forms of trade protection would be used at all.While there are a number of
answers to this question. in this paper we propose an explanation which we
believe is new.
Specifically, we argue that the incomplete information which the
government has about domestic agents means that tariffs become an optimal
instrument to protect them from import competition.To see this argument.
suppose that some-individual is initially selling the amount x0 of a product at
the price p0. and then the price drops to p'.Itis clear that if the govern-
ment provided an income transfer or (p0-p1 )x°. then the individual could not be
worse oil from the price fall:even if she decided to sell the same amount x0.
then she would still receive total income of p1x0 • (pQ-p')x°p0x0, which is
the same as InItially.More generally, If the Individual changed her behavior in
response to price change, while receiving this income transfer, then she Would
be better oil.Thus, by providing income transfers of this type, the government
can ensure that all individuals (whether they are buyers or sellers of the
product) gain from the price fall.4However, if the government does riot actually observe the amount sold,
then the income transfer (p0-p')x° cannot be calculated:we refer to this as a
situation of incomplete information.In practise, we could expect that it
would be very difficult for the government to know the sales level of each firm
in an industry, or the factor supply of each worker to that industry, so that
compensating these individuals through income transfers becomes infeasible.
This problem was recognized by Hufbauer and Rosen (1986. p. 77) in their
proposal to compensate firms and workers for reductions in U.S. tariffs and
quotas.They suggested that a complete list of workers, capital and farmland
engaged in an industry could be made on aninventory date,which would
therefore determine who is eligible for compensation.In practise, we could
imagine that such a scheme could be subject to various misrepresentation of the
actual inputs employed at theinventory date.
When the government does not observe the quantities x0 sold or purchased.
itis intuitive that a tariff becomes an informationally efficient form of
compensating the sellers.For example, the tariff of (p0-p') would fully
compensate sellers for the price drop, and would also be financed by the same
tariff applied to buyers of the import.The problem, of course, is that this
tariff would lead to the same initial consumption and sales decisions, and
therefore would not generate gains from trade (except for the possible tariff
revenue, which could be redistributed).In deriving an optimal policy in the
presence of incomplete information, the question is whether at least some
individuals can strictly gain from the drop in the import prices, with no one
being worse off.We find that such Pareto gains are indeed possible, and the
optimal policy instrument isa (nonlinear) tariff.
In section 2 we outline our model.For simplicity, we ignore production
and consider a pureexchange economywhere individuals differ in their endow-
2ment of the importable good.Depending on their endowment, and the price, each
person Is then a buyer or seller of the importable.With a drop in the import
price, we assume the government faces the political constraint of bringing each
person back to their initial level or welfare. i.e. achieving Pareto gains from
the Increased trade.While we do not model the rational for this constraint.
we could imagine that the government faces political pressure which would
prevent trade from being increased unless most individuals gain.
In sectIon 2 we also describe the type of policies the government can use.
which we assume are a quite general combination of taxes and quantity of the
import, both of which can differ across individuals.These policy options
certainly include tariffs and simple income transfers as a special case, and
more generally, allow for nonlinear tariffs which vary with the amount bought
or sold.We also introduce the idea ofincentive compatibtepolicies;these
policies make it optimal for agents to truthfully reveal their endowments of
the importable good, but at the same time, constrain the actions of the
government.Thus, the lack of information faced by the government is remedied
by ensuring the individuals will voluntarily report their true sales or purchases
of the import, but this behavior comes at the cost of adding anincentive
compatibilityconstraint on the available policies.
In section 3 we solve for the optimal government policies, subject to the
political constraint of ensuring Pareto gains from trade, the incentive com-
patibility constraint, and the government's budget constraint.We find that the
optimal policies take the form of nonlinear tariffs, so that both buyers and
sellers of the import face an effective price which exceeds its world level p'.
Thus, there is an implied tax on buyers and subsidy to sellers.We discuss
various properties of the tariff schedule.In section 4 we argue that the
tartffs are never complete. in the sense of bringing prices for all individuals
3back to their initial level p°.Rather, it will always be possible to make some
individuals strictly better off than at the initial prices, while ensuring that no
persons are worse oil'.In this sense, strict gains from trade are obtained.
Conclusions are given in section 5.
2.The Model
2.1AssumDtions and Notation
There are two goods in the economy .denoted by x and y, with y being the
numeraire good.There is a continuum of individuals in the economy who are
distinguished by the initial endowment of good x that they possess.All indivi-
duals have the same initial endowmenty0 or the good y.We shall let $ be the
initial endowment of x, and assume that e ranges in the interval F(e)
represents the number or individuals with x-endowments less than or equal to
e.The density of individuals with endowment e is given by 1(8) = F(8). and we
assume for simplicity that ff(8)de 1.In what follows we will also assume
that a standard hazard rate property is satisfied. d/de (F(e)/r(e)1 >
All individuals share the same quasi-linear utility function U(y.x.$) given
by:
U(x.y.e)y0 •y* •(x • 8). (1)
where y and x represent the net purchases of the two goods.We assume that
> 0 and •< 0.
For simplicity there is no domestic production.Initially the economy
laces the price p0 for good x. which may be either the autarky equilibrium
price, or given exogenously by world markets.Each individual solves:
max U(x,y.e)subject top0x• 0. (2)
4.Let (y°.x°) be the unique solution to (2).Expressing x0 as a function a,itis
easy to show that:
x°(e)i(p°) —8. (3)
where ji is the Inverse function of •', and x°'(G)-1.Note that the choice of
x0 varies inversely with the initial endowment 8.When x < 0 Cx>'0) we say
that the individual is a seller (buyer) of x.We will be supposing that x is the
import good, with a zero or positive amount imported at the price p0.
Theutility for a type a person in the initial equilibrium is given by:
U°(e)=U(x°.y°.e).
Employing the Envelope Theorem, itis immediate that U°'(e) = •(x°(8) • el = p°.
The utility schedule ii°(e) corresponding to the initial equilibrium is shown• in
Figure 1.SInce x°'(G) < 0, there exists some such that all individuals
with initial endowments of x greater than è will be sellers in equilibrium, and
all individuals with endowments less than Ô will be buyers or x in equilibrium.
The boundarytype is also shown in Figure 1.
Now suppose that the price or imports x falls fromPC to p1< p0.For
the moment assume that there are no import restrictions or tariffs, and that
individuals still retain the same initial endowments of y and x.Then in the
new free trade equilibrium. x and y will be chosen to:
max U(x,y.e)subject top'x. y. (4)
Let (x',y') be the unique solution to (4), and denote by U'(e)U(x'.y1.e) the
corresponding utility as a function of a.As before itis straightforward to
show that U''(e) :'(x1(e).8] p1.
5Looking at Figure 1wheretJt(G)is compared with U°(e). one can see that
all buyers and some marginal sellers of x would benefit from the chance to
purchase less expensive imported goods.However the larger sellers, whose
income would depend heavilyon the sales revenues fromx. would obviouslybe
harmed by the less expensive imports.If the domestic government were
informed as to the type of each individual (as characterized bytheir initial
endowments) it could trnpose a suitable lump tax on those benefitting from
imports, and distribute these revenues to those who wereharmed, so as to make
all individuals better off under free trade.However, without this information
such transfers are not possible.In this case the government may need to
resort to second best policies, which are constrained by the privateinformation
that individuals possess about their initial endowments.
2.2Informational lu Constrained Policies
To examine inforrnationally constrained policies, we make thefollowing
assumptions about the governments available policy options.First, we assume
that while the initial endowments of a given individual are privateknowledge,
the government does have aggregate data on initial endowments in that the
distribution of types 1(e) is known.
Second, we assume that the government is able to offer a menu of options
which consist of pairs (T.x), where I is a fee which is paid by the individual in
return for tbs right to buy or sell a specified quantity x at the going world
price p'.Notice, that T may be negative, in which case the individual receives
a subsidy from the government.The individual's budget constraint becomes:
I •• p'x = 0.
6Substituting foryin terms of T and x from the budget constraint, we can
rewrite utility in terms of T.x. and 8 as:
U(T.x.e)•(x • e) • y - p1x -T.
Specifying a schedule of T's and x's allows the government to try to
compensate the losers from import competition with funds that have been
raised from the buyers of the imports.When the government announces a menu
(T(e),x(e)}.itrealizes that each individual will select the combination of
taxes and imports which are optimal for them.In particular, an individual
must find itin their interest to report a false value of 9.The government can
limit this behavior, however, by choosing the schedule (T(e).x(8)}which makes
itin the best interest of each person to truthfully report their type. We
model this requirement as the incentive compatibility constraint,which is
formally written as:
u(e le) . U(T(e),x(e).e)￿ UCT(e'),x(e').el • U(e je) for all e.e'. (IC]
Define U(e) • U(e 8).Then a useful characterization of policies which satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint is given by:
Lemma 1A policy {x(G),T(e)} satisfies (IC] if and onlyif:
a) U'(e) = •'(x(e) •9];
b) x(8) is nonincreasing.
The proof follows standard arguments presented in Guesnerieand Laffont (1984)
and so Is omitted.
7Our third requirement On the government policies is thatit must be
polttically acceptable.A strong form of political acceptability which we shall
impose here is that no individual can be made worse off from the import
competition.The political acceptability(PA] constraint is written as:
U(e) ￿U°(e)for all 0. (PM
Weaker forms of the (PA) constraint could be used by requiring that only a
fraction (perhaps a majority) of individuals gain from the increase in trade, on
the argument that if enough people gain than the action would be politically
feasible.7
Finally, the government operates under a budget constraint, meaning that
it has limited funds to implement the import policy.We model this budget
constraint (BC] by requiring:
IT(z)dF(z) * W￿ 0. (Bc]
whereis some fixed budget (possibly zero) which the government has to work
with.
3.Analysts
We can now state the government's problem (GP] in trying to formulate
an optimal import policy.We envision that government chooses a policy
{x(e),T(efl to maximize the expected utility of all individuals in the economy
plus the government budget surplus subject to the (IC]. (PA). and [BC]
constraints.Formally,we can represent the government's problem as:
8max
Ix(e).T(e)}
H {$(x(8)*e) +-p'x(e) - 1(e) * T(e) +
x[T(e) *
*j.L(e)(U(e)-u°(e)] (GP]
• p(e)($(x(e).G) + - p1x(e) — 1(e) — uCe)]
•(e)$'(x(e),e)} dF(e).
The first line of the Hamiltonian H representstotal expected surplus, inclusive
of the budget surplus.The second line captures the (BC] constraint.The third
line captures the (PA] constraint, where we aretreating U(e) as a state
variable.Line four defines the state variable, and the finalline represents the
equation of motion for the state variable, which comes frompart (a) of Lemma
1. We will verify that part (b) of Lemma 1is satisfied once the characteri-
zation of the solution to (GP] is complete.
Maximizing H pointwise with respect to x(e) and 1(e) weobtain the
following conditions:
aH/ax(e)($'-p1](1.p) • 0, (5a)
ÔH/ÔT(e)x-p0. (Sb)
aH/ou(e)(j.i-p)f(e)=- a('(e)f(e))/e. (5c)
- U°(.)] =()(U() - U°()] =0. (5d)
(transversality conditions)
gIn what follows we assume that the [PA] constraint only binds at 0
meaning that all other individuals obtain utility strictly greater than U°(e).
As we discuss below, this is the case when the government's budget constrarnt
is not too stringent (see section 4).When (PA] in not binding this implies that
the multiplier ji(e) =0.Also by assumption. U(.) - U°(.) > 0 which implies
= 0. from (5d).Substituting for p from (5b) and using(5c) we can
express (e) as:
(e) =XF(e)/f(e).
Combining this with (5a) implies:
—(X/(1 .X)][F(0)/f(0)). (6)
The solution to COP] is distinguished by whether the government budget
constraint is binding or not binding. We now turn to these two cases.
3.1Nonbinding overnment Budoet Constraint
According to (6), x(G) = x'(e)and there is free tradeinthe imported
good x. whenever the government's budget constraint is not binding so that X =
0.Otherwise if (BC] is binding so that X > 0. (6) implies that consumption of
the imported good will be inefficiently small. Therefore itis of interest to
know when (BC] isbinding.Arguing intuitively. (BC] will bind when the
government must offer more compensation to individuals to insure the free
trade policy is politically acceptable than the budget allows.
Figure 1illustrates the utility obtained initially (1)0(0)1 and after the
fallin the import price (U'(e)] by the various agents.Without government
transfers, buyers of x (low a types) tend to gain under free trade while sellers
10of x (high e types) lose.If[BC] is not binding then the government must be
compensating these individuals with lump sum transfers.However the identity
of the sellers in not known to the government, sothat alt individuals can apply
for this subsidy.As a consequence. all individuals receive the lump sum subsidy
which is shown as L in Figure : enou9h to ensurethat the highest 0 type is no
worse off from the importcompetition, while everyone else gains.Since we
have assumed that the total numberof individuals in the economy is unity,it
follows that the total transfer paid bythe government (the negative of taxes)
also equals L. which we presume ispositive as illustrated.'
Thus, if W: 0 in (BC]. then itis immediate that the government budget
constraint is not met, so that free trade cannot beachieved.However, even if
B> 0. meaning that the government has somefunds available to distribute, we
can argue that (BC] will be violatedif the dispersion of types is sufficiently
large.To make this argument. consider a meanpreserving variationof e.
where we define a new variable(X.e) which is given by:
e * oi(e-ö), (7)
where> 0 andis the mean 01' 9. Then we have:
Proposition 1
[BC] is binding in the solution to (GP] ifis sufficiently large. -
The proof of Proposition 1proceeds by simply calculating howthe
transfer L depends on . From Figure1we have Lu°() - U'(). or after
applying the mean preserving spread, Lu°() - u1(').Then using Lemma 1
and (7) we calculate that:
11dL/do(U°'()- U '()]t -ê')
=(p0- p1)(i- ö) >0.
Thus, for sufficiently highwe must have that payments L exceed the available
revenueso that (BC] is binding.We turn to an analysis of this case next.
3.2Binding Government Budget Constraint
As we have shown, the budget constraint will be binding ii there is
sufficient heterogeneity among individuals in terms of their initial endowments
of x (or ifW is small).In this instance the solution to (GP] is characterized
by the following:
proposition2
Assume (BCI is binding, and •"' ￿ 0.Then the solution to [GPI satisfies:
a)•'pt•
b)x°(G) ￿ x(e) ￿ x1(e)(with strict inequality for Q, < e < 8):
c)x'(G) < 0;





Proposition 2 is proved in the Appendix. As the reader might have expected.
when thebudget constraint is binding then itis not possible to achieve the
efficient free trade solution.What results is a compromise policy which
allows for some partial movement towards the free trade solution, as indicated
by part (b).
12Parts (a) and Cc) imply that buyers of the good x are taxed on the margin
at the rate (x).On the other hand, sellers of x receive a marginal subsidy
equal to z(x).We can think of (x) as a nonlinear tariff, which varies with
the quantity imported.The result of this tariffis to lower consumption, raise
domestic sales, and restrict imports into the economy.
The tariff is introduced because of the binding budget constraint.To
balance the budget, the government must limit the rents whichindividuals earn
from their private information.Figure 2 shows the utilities UCe)of different
e types under the solution to (GPI, in comparison tothe initial level of utility
U°(e).The gap between U(e) and U°(e) represents theinformation rent earned
by each individual.This rent is increasing as we move down the 0 scale at the
rate of p0 - •'(x(e).e].This rate can be reduced by inducing smaller levels of
x(8) since • is strictly concave.This is accomplished by introducing the
noninear tariff (x).
According to part Cc), t(x) is decreasing with x.Thus, the tariff is
decreasing in the amount sold, and the sales subsidies (for x <0) exceed the
consumption taxes (for x > 0).As we explained above, the tariff t(x) is levied
to encourage a reduction in x.This decreases the rate at which individuals earn
higher rents from the private information about theirendowments.Looking at
Figure 2, we see that itis particularly important to limit the rents for the
high 8 types, since this also reduces the rents for all 8 typesbelow them.
Consequently, the distortions become less for smaller 8 typessince itis not as
important to limit their information rents.Thus, the tariff distortions are
largest for the high 8 types (sellers of x) and smallest for thelow 0 types
(buyers of x).
To complete our characterization of the solution to(GP] let us analyze
the tax function T.Recall that we can represent utility as
13u(T.x.e) = tV(x.8) *- p'x - I
Solving for T in terms of U. and using part (a) of Lemma 1and (6). we can
represent the tax function as:
8
1(e)—u°()••'(x(z) .zldz * • -p1x + (8)
8
From part Cc) of Proposition 2 we know thatx(e) is invertible, so we can
represent 8 as a function of x, say 8(x).Differentiating 1 with respect to x
we obtain:
T'(x)•'(x * 8(x)] -p1t(x) > 0.
r(x)t'(x) < 0,
by part (d) of Proposition 2.This implies that the schedule (T,x} appears as in
Figure 3 where I is an increasing, concave function of x.
When presented with this schedule individuals choose the point onthe 1(x)
curve which maximizes their utility.Note that the marginal rate of transfor-
mation of I for xfor individual 8 is given by:
dT/dX •'[x(G) • -p'=
U
so that different e types locate at a tangency point alongthe T(x) schedule, as
indicated in Figure 3.Since 1(x) is strictly concave, it can be supported by a
series or linear schedules (L(e),t(8)}, where L is a lump sum subsidy ortax.
andis a per unit tax or subsidy placed on the consumption or sale of x.Two
such linear schedules for e and 82 are illustrated in Figure 3.In theory then.
the schedule (T,x} could be administered in a decentralized fashion byallowingrndividuals to choose from a series of two part tariffs {L(8).t(e)} according to
their type.This observation is formally statedtfl:
Proposition3
The solution to [GP] can be implemented in a decentralized means by allowing
individuals to choose from a schedule of two part tariffs {L(e).t(e)}.
Under this policy, an individual faces the tax (subsidy) or t($) on all units
consumed (sold), where this tax rate does not vary with quantity.The tax rate
differs across tndivtduals. however, with each person choosing their preferred
combination of the marginal tax t(8) and lump sum subsidy L(e).
4.Gainsfrom Trade are Always Possible
In our discussion above we were assuming that the [PA) constraint was
binding only at 8e, while individuals with lower endowments of good x
obtained strictly higher utility than initially.This situation was illustrated
by the utility schedule U(e) lying strictly above U°(e) in Figure 2(except at .
However, if the government budget constraint is too stringent(W is very low),
it may not be possible to ensure these gains to alt individuals.
In terms of our earlier analysis, suppose that X — themultiplier on the
budget constraint - rises.Then from (6) we see that • would rise for any
given value of $< 0.Using Lemma 1, this means that utility declines at a
faster rate for lower 8.However, in Figure 2 if utility declines too rapidly
around e then the utility schedule U(e) wul fall below theschedule U°(8).
which violates the (PA] constraint.Instead, the solution to (GM would involve
a utility level lice) just equal to U°(e) over someinterval (e',i), with utility
rising above its initial level for tower values of 8.This schedule is shown as
ISAB in Figure 2.The results of Proposition 2 would stillapply, except that x(8)
= x°(e) for $ e(e'..
The question then arises as to whether someindividuals can always gain
from the lower import price, asalong the utility schedule AB in Figure 2.
That is. can we be sure thatstarting with non-negative government revenue, and
zero or positive tradeat the prices p0. the government will be ableto devise a
policy whtch leaves someindividuals strictly better off and none worse?The
following result shows that this isindeed the case:gains from trade are
always possible.
Proposition4
Suppose that W￿ 0. with zero orpositive imports at the price p°.Then with
p1< p°. there exists aschedule (1'(o).i'(e)} satisfying (IC] and (BC] suchthat
U(T..e)￿U°(e) for all 8. with strict inequality for some e.
In Figure 2 the range of individuals whogain from the government policy
is shown by AB', while all other personsobtain U(s) = u°(e).The idea behind
the proof of Proposition 4 is that is is alwayspossible to allow a small set of
individuals to purchase the imports x'(8) rather thanx°(e). but then apply
higher taxes 1(8) on them reflecting their higherutility.For the person just
indifferent between obtaining the greater imports atthe higher taxes (thatis.
the individual at B'). the extra taxes which thegovernment collects is exactly
equal to their rise in utility from the extra imports.Since this extra utility
is non-negligible, the government obtains higher revenuethat ifjust applied a
complete tariff of (p°-p1) and forced everyone to theirinitial consumption and
utility level.Thus, allowing the set of individuals alongAB' to consume x1(6)
imports yields higher utility for them, and greater revenuefor the government.
165.Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that (nonlinear) tariffs can arise as the
optimal instrument for protecting a domestic group from import competition.
when the government is constrained by incompLete information.In this
setting, the Lump sum transfers which would be needed to compensate each
seller for the price drop cannot be computed, since they depend on the initial
quantity sold.9The (nonlinear) tariff becomes a method for compensating those
who lose from the price drop, while raising the revenue for those who gain, and
still securing strictly positive gains for some individuals.
It might be useful to contrast the role of information in our model with
an alternative model presented by Magee, Brock and Young(1989).They have
delightfully suggested that tariffs can arise under the heading ofOptimal
obfuscation and the theory of the second worst.The idea is the government
may rationally choose tariffs when voters are imperfectlyinformed, since the
voters do not recognize this instrument as a consumption tax.Thus, in their
model the government has more information about actual policies thanvoters.
In contrast, we have argued that the government wilt likely have lessinforma-
tion than voters. since it may not observe the exact losses faced byindividuals
due to import competition.In this case tariffs arise as an optimal policy.
subject to the informational constraints.
17Appendix
PropositiOnS 1and 3 are proved inthe main text.
ProofofpropositiOn2
Equation (6) in thetext implicitly definesx(e).Totally differentiating(6)
with respect to Ce) wehave:
* (d/de(F/f)]•
x(e) -- • (F/f)"
< 0
. (Al)
where X/(l•X).The sign of the aboveexpression foUowS from •< 0.
d/de(F/f) > 0. and •'" ￿ 0.This proves part Cc) ofthe Proposition andverifies
that part (b) of LemmaIis also satisfied.
Since x is monotone me, wecan represent 8 as a!unctiOfl of x, 8(x).
Define t . •.-p1-X$F(G(X))If(G(X)). using (6).Clearly￿ 0. with strict
inequality for 8 > ..Differentiatingwith respect to 8 weobtain '(x) =
• e).Since x'(8) < -1 byinspection of (Al). we seethat -1c e'(x) < 0.
and so '(x) < 0.This proves parts (a) andCd) of the Proposition.
By assumption (PA)binds only at 8 WThis means that U(e) >U°(e) in
a neighborhood of. Hence".d/de (U(O)U0(efl•'(x( • -p0 . 0.
implying that x() ￿ x°().But since x(8) c -lin (Al) and •< 0 we obtain
•'(x(e) • 8] — p° < 0 for all 8 <implying that x(e) >x0(e) for all e <
Finally, since t ￿ 0 withstrict inequality for 8 > , weobtain •'tx(8) * e) -
p00 and x(8)x'(G) with strict inequalityfor 8 > . This completesthe
proof of part (b).Part Ce) follows from thetransversatity conditiOn U()
U°(). and part (a) of Lemma 1
16ProoforProposition4
At price p° the country is either in autarky or there are some imports of x.
First consider the case where xis imported.Let T(e) r (p0-p1)x(9).Then given
?'(e)itis easy to verify that an individual of type 8 will prefer r(e). x°(e) to
any other choice Y($'), x°(e). and that UE1'(e).x°(e),e] = U°(e).In this case the
governments budget j5:
T(e)dFe • B(p0-p1)jx°(e)dF(e) • W > 0. (BC]
e
sincej x°(e)dF(8) > 0 and W￿ 0.But this implies that the government could
make each person strictly better off than they were under the original price p°
by giving a small poll subsidy, without violating [BC].
Now consider the case where the country isin autarky with price p0 so
e




where x1 satisfies •'(x1(9) •e] p1.In order to induce 'Ce) we must satisfy
(IC] which requires that: (a) U(e) is continuous; (b) U(e)•'('(e)•8]: and (c)
'(e) is nonincreasing.Assume for the moment that types e e (ê, are induced
to choose (Y(e),xO(e)}.Then to satisfy (a) and ensure the continuity of U(e) at
8ó. we require that {T(Ô).x'()} satisfy:u(ê)$(X1()+- p11(Ô) - T(ö)
= •(x°(Ô) + -p'x°(ô) -
so that.
1(ê) = •(x'(Ô) • —•(x°() •§1 * (6) — p1(X1() —
Using (A2), condition (b) implies that for e e
U'(e)•'(di'/de •1) - p1dx/de - T'(e) = •' = p1,
which implies T'(e)0, so that 1(e)1(ê).Finally notice that condition Cc)
is automatically satisfied by x(e).
Thus, the choices (A2) are induced by the tax function:
ICe) = 1(ê), e e[j,ê).
T(e),e(ê, ]• (A3)
We need to check that [8C1 is satisfied by (A3).Now we know that:
çT(e)dFe • (p°-p')x°(e)dF(e) •
8
since W￿ 0 andIx°(e)dF(e) =0.It follows that (BC is satisfied if:
-'(e)]dF(e)￿ 0
B
j•(x'(ê) •ê] — •(xO(ê) •êl— p'(x'(ê)—x°(ê)]
• (pO_p1)xO() — (p°—p1)x°(e)} dF(e) ￿ 0, using (A3).
20The first three terms in the integrand represent the additional consumer
surplus generated by allowing worker type ö to expand his consumption of x
from x0 to x1at price p1.Call this increase in consumer surplus (ö).
Rewriting the expression above we have:
e
t(e)F(e) + [x°(Ô)-x°(e)]dF(e) ￿ 0.
Q
Now x0(e) • e is constant for e e [e,), since •[x°(e) • p0. so that x°(e)
• (-e).Substituting this into the expression above we have:
e
* (p°-1)j (ê-edF(e) ￿ 0
a(ê)F(ê) + (p°-p')(ê-Ee)F(ô) ￿ 0.
F(ê)[A(ô) * (p°-p'Xê- Ee)]￿ 0,
where ce is the mean of 8 conditioned on 8[e.ö).Notice that- E8
e — e
approaches zero as ê approaches . However, the consumer surplus termMô)
approaches () > 0 as 8 -0.It follows that there exits aê sufficiently
close tosuch that the above inequality is satisfied, so that the induced
allocation satisfies (BCI.
FinaliM it remains for us to show that under this allocation some persons
are strictlU better off than they were in the original equilibrium.Itis easy














For example, tariffs are assumed in the models of Brock and Magee (1 978).
Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982). Ftndlay and Weltisz (1982).Mayer (1984) and
Wilson and WeLlisz (1982).
2See Dinopoulos (1 983). Cassing and Hillman (1985) and Hillman and Ursprung
(1988) who compare tariris and quotas, and Feenstra and Lewis (1988) who
allow for tariff—rate quotas.
Mayer and Riezman (1989) consider a model where voters differ in multiple
dimensions, in which case tariffs can arise as a Pareto-optimal outcome of a
voting process.
4It can be argued that transfers of this type are also feasible for the
government. i.e. the revenue collected from the buyers of imports by imposing a
lump-sum tax of (p°-p1 )x° exceeds the lump-sum transfer providing tosellers.
5 This property is invoked to eliminate the possibility of pooling equilibria
from arising, which would unduly complicate our analysis.
6That is.it could give the lump sum transfers (p°-p1)x°(e) > 0 to sellers,and
(p°-pt)x°(e) < 0 to buyers of the import good x.
This form of the (PA] constraint is considered in our earlier paper,Lewis.
Feenstra and Ware (1989). which examines the compensation to firmsfrom a
drop in the import price.
•If the price drop is very large, then itis possible that all sellers of x will
become consumers, and everyone can gain from the lowerimport price.In this
case there is no need for any government intervention(L0).
See footnote 6.
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